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Abstract 
Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine 
Learning (ML) that are being applied to legal efforts 
have raised controversial questions about the existent 
restrictions imposed on the practice-of-law. Generally, 
the legal field has sought to define Authorized 
Practices of Law (APL) versus Unauthorized Practices 
of Law (UPL), though the boundaries are at times 
amorphous and some contend capricious and self-
serving, rather than being devised holistically for the 
benefit of society all told. A missing ingredient in 
these arguments is the realization that impending legal 
profession disruptions due to AI can be more robustly 
discerned by examining the matter through the lens of 
a framework utilizing the autonomous levels of AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR). This paper explores a newly 
derived instrumental grid depicting the key 
characteristics underlying APL and UPL as they apply 
to the AILR autonomous levels and offers key insights 
for the furtherance of these crucial practice-of-law 
debates. 
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autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, 
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1 Background and Context 
Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine 
Learning (ML) that are being applied to legal efforts 
have raised controversial questions about the existent 
restrictions imposed on the practice-of-law [1] [4] [31] 
[37]. Generally, the legal field has sought to define 
Authorized Practices of Law (APL) versus 
Unauthorized Practices of Law (UPL), though the 
boundaries are at times amorphous and some contend 
capricious and self-serving, rather than being devised 
holistically for the benefit of society all told [44] [47].  
 
It is argued herein that a missing ingredient in these 
debates is the realization that impending legal 
profession disruptions due to AI can be more robustly 
discerned by examining the matter through the lens of 
a framework utilizing the autonomous levels of AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR). 
 
Such a grid is presented in this paper and discussed in 
several respects, including the basis for its 
formulation, the nature of its utility, and productive 
opportunities for further extension. 
 
In this paper, five sections are used to cover the topic 
at hand: 
• Section 1: Background and Context 
• Section 2: Key Factors of the APL versus UPL 
• Section 3: Autonomous Levels of AI Legal   
               Reasoning 
• Section 4: APL and UPL Grid Integrating  
               Autonomous Levels of AILR 
• Section 5: Additional Considerations and Future  
               Research 
 
In Section 1, an overall background on the matter of 
APL and UPL is provided. Section 2 then goes further 
in-depth and identifies what is asserted as key factors 
underlying APL and UPL. In Section 3, an overview is 
provided on the autonomous levels of AI Legal 
Reasoning, crucial to understanding Section 4, which 
provides a grid that aligns the APL/UPL key factors 
with the autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning. 
Section 5 is a discussion of additional considerations 
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and also offers suggested avenues for future research 
on these matters. 
 
1.1 Boundaries of APL and UPL 
 
The legal profession has established and continues to 
maintain that there are Authorized Practices of Law 
and Unauthorized Practices of Law. Questions 
regarding the scope and boundaries of APL versus 
UPL arise with some frequency and especially as 
technology has advanced, including for example issues 
surrounding online services such as LegalZoom that 
provide a claimed capability of producing legal 
documents by the act of filling in interactive 
questionnaires [47]. In short, some argue that this kind 
of service is tantamount to the practice of law and yet 
is not being performed by an attorney in the act of 
conducting those services, therefore, it should be 
considered as overtly unauthorized and deemed ergo 
unlawful (for legal analyses on these contentions, see 
for example Shipman [47], Gillers [31], McGinnis 
[38], and Barton [6]). 
 
Matters such as the LegalZoom controversy remain 
unsettled and will likely increase in frequency and 
magnitude as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
especially Machine Learning (ML) are added into 
these computer-based systems that purport to provide 
legal services, often referred to as LegalTech [22] [23] 
[24]. As advances in LegalTech become boosted via 
AI and ML capabilities, the boundaries of whether 
those systems are APL or UPL will undoubtedly get 
further debated and fuel existent disputes over these 
issues.  
 
One viewpoint on the LegalZoom type of offerings is 
that as long as such services are only providing static 
forms and not otherwise seemingly rendering legal 
advice, they can avoid falling into the unauthorized 
classification or UPL. As per Barton [6]: “UPL is 
prohibited in all fifty states. The definition of the 
‘practice of law’ and the levels of enforcement differ 
from state to state, but at a minimum in no state may a 
nonlawyer appear in court on behalf of another party. 
Likewise, nonlawyers may not give ‘legal advice.’ 
State bars have long allowed the publication of ‘forms 
books’ despite the UPL strictures but have drawn the 
line at the provision of advice along with forms.” 
 
Note that a crucial cornerstone in such an argument 
entails the rendering or provisioning of legal advice.  
 
Though that might seem like a straightforward 
restriction, attempts to definitively codify or stipulate 
exactly what constitutes legal advice has been 
generally problematic. McClure [37] points out that 
“state law establishes the parameters of ‘the practice of 
law,’ these definitions vary from state to state, but 
generally, states require bar association admission 
before either an attorney or a layperson may engage in 
the practice of law.” As such, the shift of attention 
goes toward whether someone is approved to grant 
legal advice, as opposed to focusing on what the 
nature of legal advice itself entails. Similarly, as 
pointed out further by McClure [37]: “The American 
Bar Association's Model Rule 5.5 prohibits a person 
not admitted to the bar association of a particular 
jurisdiction from practicing law in that specific 
jurisdiction. A person who is not admitted to the bar 
association may not represent to the public that he or 
she may practice law in that jurisdiction." 
 
In essence, avoidance of defining the challenging 
constructs of “legal advice” is deftly undertaken by 
sidestepping over into the assertion that only bona fide 
attorneys can generate or produce legal advice. Thus, 
the practice of law is seen as that which attorneys do, 
instead of stating that it is a specified instantiation of 
legal counsel or legal reasoning involved. Shipman 
[47] emphasizes the disingenuously distorted logic that 
this portends in these matters: “It is ironic, given the 
zealous policing of unauthorized practice of law, that 
there is not a strong consensus for defining what the 
practice of law actually is. Comment 2 to Rule 5.5 in 
the Model Rules says that the definition of practice of 
law is jurisdiction specific and therefore a flexible 
construct.” 
 
This is not to suggest that being able to somehow 
articulate systematically and with measurable 
precision the practice-of-law and its constituent 
elements of legal reasoning can be readily achieved. In 
fact, it is generally deemed as problematic, resistant to 
specification, and persistently remains relatively non-
standardized. As Shipman [47] aptly explains: “This 
amorphous standard makes sense given the fact that 
‘the boundaries of the practice of law are unclear and 
have been prone to vary over time and geography,’ 
and also because the multifaceted nature of providing 
legal services makes it difficult to render an exhaustive 
list of everything the lawyer does in one definition.” 
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In the next subsection, this discussion about these 
matters will address the various cited bases for why 
restricting the practice of law is ostensibly justified. 
 
1.2 Restrictions on the Practice of Law 
 
The oft-cited rationale for restricting the practice-of-
law in terms of only allowing attorneys to undertake 
such privileges is that this appropriately protects the 
public and ensures that society is well-served when it 
comes to justice and the consumption of legal services 
[45] [51]. The posture taken is that if just anyone was 
allowed to assert that they were able to practice law, 
the layperson seeking legal advice might find 
themselves receiving specious legal advice or worse 
still outright untoward legal advisement. By keeping 
the provisioning of legal advice to those certified or 
authorized to do so, the assumption is that the public 
will more easily obtain such advice and be less likely 
to bear the foul fruits of insufficient or improper legal 
advice. Via a policing function by the legal profession 
itself, those that have been granted this duly decreed 
authorization to render legal advice will seemingly be 
countered and penalized if they violate this instituted 
capacity [41]. 
 
As will be articulated in a moment, besides the 
rendering of legal advice, there are several additional 
characteristics opined as essential to the rationale for 
an overall restriction related to dispensing of legal 
advice.  
 
Besides seeking to control who can proffer legal 
advice, the asserted benefits of restricting the practice-
of-law encompass other equally vital factors such as 
creating the venerated lawyer-client relationship and 
all of its afforded advantages. Per Shipman [47]: 
“There are many legitimate policy reasons for the 
restrictions against the unauthorized practice of law. 
These reasons include ‘preserving and strengthening 
the lawyer-client relationship’ and protecting ‘the 
public from being advised and represented in legal 
matters by unqualified and undisciplined persons over 
whom the judicial department could exercise slight or 
no control.’ The functioning of the legal system would 
not be possible without the privileges afforded to and 
obligations imposed on lawyers when they enter into a 
formal attorney-client relationship. The formation of 
an attorney-client relationship subjects a lawyer to 
‘duties of care, loyalty, confidentiality, and 
communication, duties’ enforceable by the client and 
through disciplinary sanctions.” 
 
Not everyone necessarily views these justifications as 
being unblemished or quite so pristine. 
 
Some contend the legal profession has put in place 
rules that amount to a monopolistic effort and ought to 
be broken apart in an anti-trust manner [6] [31] [32]. 
Arguments are made that the primary purpose for the 
APL and UPL is to ensure the economic benefit of 
attorneys and the law industry and only incidentally 
exemplifies the nobler claims of seeking to provide a 
public good. Furthermore, there is the concern that 
these restrictions are stifling of new innovations, and 
merely reinforce that law should be practiced as it 
always has, attempting to keep out any disruption or 
transformations (this is generally known as the 
Collingridge [13] innovation conundrum). 
 
Shipman [47] recaps some of these concerns as 
follows: “Despite the legitimate interests that 
unauthorized practice of law statutes protect, some 
critics have rebuked these rules for several reasons. 
One chief reason is that these rules inhibit innovation 
in the legal industry. Another major critique is that the 
bar’s purpose in the promulgation of these rules has 
more to do with protecting lawyers’ economic interests 
than with concerns for the public.” 
 
Indeed, the lack of clarity about what the practice of 
law embodies, and the amorphous notions of legal 
advice, might be construed as crucial to maintaining 
the status quo, accordingly stated further by Shipman 
[47]: “However, overly broad or vague definitions of 
the practice of law can be detrimental in that they 
allow lawyers to monopolize certain activities for their 
own gain and stifle the innovation of affordable 
alternatives in the world of legal services.” 
 
Some legal scholars such as Gillers [31] have 
examined how lawyers seem to make their own rules 
in terms of determining what the practice of law is 
allowed to be, for which might be interpreted as 
relatively self-serving, and that there ought to be a 
closer inspection of the rulemaking per se:  “What is 
the responsibility of the profession itself when, 
through its various institutions and especially bar 
associations, it asks courts or (less often) lawmakers or 
agencies to adopt particular rules governing the 
conduct of lawyers? In other words, my subject is the 
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professional responsibility of the legal profession 
itself, not the conduct of individual lawyers or the 
correctness of any particular rule. My purpose is to 
suggest how the work of devising the rules, not the 
content of a specific rule, might be improved.” 
 
Everything else being equal, the legal profession will 
presumably be able to continue to keep in place these 
restrictions, though added pressure will certainly arise 
due to the advent of AI and ML improvements in 
existing LegalTech. A key question asked by those in 
the legal profession is whether the AI advances in 
LegalTech can be kept at bay and repeatedly exhorted 
as an illegitimate means of rendering legal advice, 
despite the potential incremental AI Legal Reasoning 
(AILR) advances that will emerge [21] [24].  
 
The seemingly easiest way to win that argument is by 
summarily indicating that the AI LegalTech is not an 
attorney, and as such, regardless of whether such 
systems can provide legal advice or not, they cannot 
be permitted to dispense legal counsel due to the rather 
axiomatic logic that such AI systems are not, in fact, a 
lawyer (i.e., overriding any need to examine and nor 
ascertain whether such AI systems can render proper 
and legitimate legal advice). 
 
This circular kind of argument might not survive and 
per McGinnis et al [38] has these potential 
undermining facets: “The surest way for lawyers to 
retain the market power of old is to use bar regulation 
to delay and obstruct the use of machine intelligence. 
But bar regulation will generally be unavailing. First, 
lawyers will be able to use many machine-created 
products to make their own work more cost effective. 
Thus, using machine inputs can comply with bar 
regulation, while also creating competitive pressures 
by lowering costs and reducing the need for the aid of 
other lawyers. Second, even if unauthorized practice 
laws in the United States do not change to permit 
extensive machine intelligence in the production of 
legal services, those laws will continue to prove 
ineffective in stemming the emergence of widespread 
machine lawyering and preserving lawyers’ 
monopoly.” 
 
Overall, those points by McGinnis et al [38] suggest 
that AI LegalTech will potentially be incrementally 
embraced by attorneys as a vital legal advisement tool, 
and in so doing will spur AILR advancements more 
so. Thus, attempts to continue to keep these AI 
systems in the backend by the law profession overall 
might momentarily succeed in the nearer term, but 
those AI systems will be sought for their capabilities 
and likewise, the vendors will continue to push ahead 
avidly on advancing them. Presumably, at some future 
point, the encouragement and enablement on the 
backend will bring the matter to a head in that 
eventually those AILR systems might be considered 
sufficient enough to render legal advice per se, and 
therefore aim to be unshackled from a backend 
positioning-only and be repositioned to also 
encompass the frontend of legal services rendering. 
 
Meanwhile, a second and simultaneous form of 
pressure might arise by global adoption of AI 
LegalTech for providing legal advice, doing so in 
locales that do not have the same restrictions of APL 
and UPL as does the United States. In this perspective, 
it is akin to the Genie being let out of the bottle, and 
some speculate that the prevailing approaches in the 
U.S. of denying that AI LegalTech can provide 
independent legal advice will be sorely tested by 
global adoptions. 
 
In the next section, an in-depth examination of the key 
characteristics or factors used to shape the APL versus 
UPL debate is identified and explored. 
 
2. Key Factors of the APL versus UPL 
 
Distilling the various characteristics or factors 
underlying the APL versus UPL debate provides a 
useful indication of the primary determiners involved. 
These key factors will be used to then assess how they 
differ in terms of relevance and impact per a set of 
autonomous levels entailing AI Legal Reasoning, 
doing so to illuminate the salient facets of the ongoing 
dialogue over authorized versus unauthorized practice 
of law. 
 
There are nine key factors identified, though realize 
that additional factors can be further gleaned from the 
myriad of elements utilized in ascertaining APL versus 
UPL. This core set of nine is evocative of the primary 
contentions and is sufficient for preparing and 
providing a grid that can be constructively employed 
for these discussions. Future research, which is 
mentioned in the final section of this paper, would be 
encouraged to consider adding additional key factors, 
along with subjecting the entire set of factors to an 
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assessment mechanism to potentially rate and 
appropriately rank their respective significance. 
 
2.1 Identified Key Factors 
 
The primary key factors are depicted in a short-form 
description that is considered suitable for use in a grid 
and consist of keywords to represent each factor. The 
key factors consist of: 
• Provides Legal Advice 
• Asserts Practices Law 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship 
• Qualified in Law 
• Incurs Duty of Care 
• Legal Confidentiality 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct 
• Malpractice Susceptible 
• Legal Liability 
 
In the subsections, each key factor will be briefly 
explained and explored. 
 
2.2 Details Underlying Key Factors 
 
For each of the key factors, it is foundational to explain the 
nature and scope of the factor, doing so to ensure that each 
can be representative of its focused intent. 
 
2.2.1 Provides Legal Advice 
 
The short-form keywords of “Provides Legal Advice” 
refers to the aspect that ascertaining APL versus UPL 
involves whether or not there is legal advice that is 
being proffered. As per the ABA definition [54] of the 
practice of law and as to the nature of legal advice: 
“The ‘practice of law’ is the application of legal 
principles and judgment with regard to the 
circumstances or objectives of a person that require the 
knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.” 
 
This legal advice or practice-of-law arises according to 
the ABA under these circumstances [54]:  “A person is 
presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any 
of the following conduct on behalf of another:          
(1) Giving advice or counsel to persons as to their 
legal rights or responsibilities or to those of others;    
(2) Selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents 
or agreements that affect the legal rights of a person; 
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body, 
including, but not limited to, preparing or filing 
documents or conducting discovery; or (4) Negotiating 
legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a person.” 
 
Presumably, if no legal advice is being rendered, there 
is no need to analyze whether there is an unauthorized 
or authorized practice-of-law taking place, simply due 
to the obvious aspect that there is a lack of legal advice 
being proffered. On the other hand, if legal advice is 
involved, potentially any legal advice, even the most 
infinitesimal, the question then can be dutifully asked 
about whether this is being done in an authorized 
versus unauthorized manner.  
 
Whether there is some threshold required as to the 
significance or magnitude of the legal advice is an 
open question entailing ongoing research pursuits. For 
example, if someone makes an offhand remark that 
would seemingly fit within the scope of the ABA 
indication of “selecting, drafting, or completing legal 
documents or agreements that affect the legal rights of 
the person,” does that offhand remark instantaneously 
invoke that legal advice is being given? Some assert 
that a kind of reasonableness test needs to be applied 
to ascertain whether the act has risen to a determinable 
limit. 
  
2.2.2 Asserts Practices Law 
 
The short-form keywords of “Asserts Practices Law” 
refer to the assertion or communicating that a 
capability of practicing law exists and that the giving 
of legal advice can be undertaken by the actor so 
stating the claimed capacity. 
 
A pertinent ABA provision consists of Rule 7.1 [54]: 
“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's 
services. A communication is false or misleading if it 
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or 
omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading.” 
 
Equally pertinent is the ABA Rule 5.5 [54]: “(a) A 
lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in 
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in 
that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. (b) A 
lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction shall not: (1) except as authorized by these 
Rules or other law, establish an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction 
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for the practice of law; or (2) hold out to the public or 
otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to 
practice law in this jurisdiction.” 
 
2.2.3 Lawyer-Client Relationship 
 
The short-form keywords of “Lawyer-Client 
Relationship” refers to the aspect that a special 
relationship is enacted between a lawyer and their 
client, offering various protections and legal 
obligations by the lawyer so bounded. 
 
Per the ABA Rule 1.1 [54]: “A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
the representation,” and as stated in Rule 1.3 “A 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.” 
 
2.2.4 Qualified in Law 
 
The short-form keywords of “Qualified in Law” refers 
to the requirement that the legal advisor is 
appropriately qualified in law. 
 
Per the ABA [54], these are the expected licensing 
requirements to be an attorney and practice law: “Have 
a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent. Complete three 
years at an ABA-accredited law school. Pass a state 
bar examination, which usually lasts for two or three 
days. The exam tests knowledge in selected areas of 
law. There are also required tests on professional 
ethics and responsibility. Pass a character and fitness 
review. Applicants for law licenses must be approved 
by a committee that investigates character and 
background. Take an oath, usually swearing to support 
the laws and the state and federal constitutions. 
Receive a license from the highest court in the state, 
usually the state supreme court.” 
 
2.2.5 Incurs Duty of Care 
 
The short-form keywords of “Incurs Duty of Care” 
refers to the need for lawyers to act mindfully when 
performing their legal acts for clients, and the 
sufficiency of care is usually evaluated per the 
prevailing standards of professional competence in law 
and as applicable to the matter at hand. 
 
As per the ABA indication of a lawyer’s 
responsibilities [54]: “As a representative of clients, a 
lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a 
lawyer provides a client with an informed 
understanding of the client's legal rights and 
obligations and explains their practical implications. 
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's 
position under the rules of the adversary system. As 
negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the 
client but consistent with requirements of honest 
dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by 
examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about 
them to the client or to others.” 
 
2.2.6 Legal Confidentiality 
 
The short-form keywords of “Legal Confidentiality” 
refers to the confidentiality formed as part of the 
lawyer-client relationship. 
 
Per ABA Rule 1.6 [54]: “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client 
unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure 
is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by 
paragraph (b).” The aspects of permitted disclosure are 
stipulated in the Rule 1.6 portion “b” and include 
various conditions such as confidentiality may be 
usurped to prevent certain death or substantial bodily 
harm, to prevent a client from committing a crime or 
fraud, etc. 
 
2.2.7 Enforceable Prof Conduct 
 
The short-form keywords of “Enforceable Prof 
Conduct” refers to the aspect that there is an 
expectation of professional conduct by a lawyer in the 
practice of the law and that this requirement of 
conduct is enforceable such that if conduct falls below 
the requisite level then there are adverse consequences 
that can be imposed upon the attorney so violating the 
code of conduct. 
 
As per the ABA stipulation [54]: “A lawyer's conduct 
should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's 
business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the 
law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not 
to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should 
demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those 
who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and 
7 
 
public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when 
necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, 
it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.” 
 
2.2.8 Malpractice Susceptible 
 
The short-form keywords of “Malpractice Susceptible” 
refers to a potential failing on the part of the legal 
advisor to render proper legal advice and to the degree 
that professional misconduct has occurred and caused 
harm to another person, making them susceptible to a 
malpractice claim. 
 
Per the ABA [54]: “Lawyers make mistakes. 
Sometimes those mistakes have consequences. 
Ultimately, a viable legal malpractice claim will turn 
on the facts of the case; but here are three basic things 
to consider in determining if an attorney’s mistake 
justifies a legal malpractice lawsuit,” which 
encompasses whether the attorney was negligent, 
whether the mistake caused damage, and whether the 
damages were significant. 
 
2.2.9 Legal Liability 
 
The short-form keywords of “Legal Liability” refers to 
a wide array of potential liability exposures for 
attorneys and oftentimes is bucketed into three major 
facets: (1) disciplinary or violation of legal 
professional ethics codes, (2) civil claims of liability 
including malpractice, and (3) criminal claims of 
liability in the duty of an attorney as an officer of the 
court and a presumed guardian of the legal system. 
 
In the realm of civil claims of liability, malpractice is 
singled out in the list of the key factors as shown in the 
prior subsection. Beyond malpractice, it is customary 
to consider other acts of liability such as liability for 
breach of contract, liability for violation of regulatory 
statutes, and so on. Thus, the value of having a broader 
category of “Legal Liability” is to ensure that the 
narrower construing of malpractice would not 
inadvertently omit or overshadow other forms of legal 
liability. 
 
2.3 Connecting Key Factors With AILR 
 
This section has identified the APL/UPL key factors. 
The next section describes the autonomous levels of 
AI Legal Reasoning, providing sufficient context to 
then align together with the key factors and the LoA 
AILR in composing an instrumental assessment grid. 
 
3.0 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [25].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with the APL/UPL key factors identified in 
the prior section of this paper, and thus it is useful to 
first explain what each of the autonomous levels 
consists of. 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
3.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
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any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
3.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
3.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
3.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
3.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [17] [18] [20].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
 
3.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
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3.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
4.0 APL and UPL Grid Integrating Autonomous 
Levels of AILR 
 
4.1 Grid Indication of Levels of Autonomy (LoA) by 
Key Factors 
 
In this section, the APL/UPL key factors depicted in 
Section 2 are aligned into a grid that also contains the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning which were 
described in Section 3. 
 
Figure B-1 provides an overview chart depicting the 
rows as the respective LoA AILR levels and the 
columns denoting the APL/UPL key factors. A row-
by-row explanatory narrative is provided in the 
subsections below. 
 
Figure B-2 provides a similar overview chart of 
Figure B-1 but does so with the rows indicating the 
APL/UPL key factors and the columns showcasing the 
APL/UPL key factors. This is simply an alternative 
perspective of Figure B-1 and does not introduce any 
new content or alterations from the contents depicted 
in Figure B-1. A row-by-row explanatory narrative is 
provided in the subsections below. 
 
4.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 0 of the LoA 
AILR have an “n/a” (meaning “not applicable”) for 
each of the APL/UPL key factors. 
 
This designating of “n/a” seems applicable for Level 0 
since there is considered no automation and no AILR 
autonomy involved at Level 0. As such, there is 
presumably no opportunity for any potential claim or 
contention that the automation or autonomy is 
providing legal advice, and likewise, it is not asserting 
that it is practicing law, it does not create a lawyer-
client relationship, and so on. 
 
Here then is Level 0: 
 
Level 0 
• Provides Legal Advice: n/a 
• Asserts Practices Law: n/a 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: n/a 
• Qualified in Law: n/a 
• Incurs Duty of Care: n/a 
• Legal Confidentiality: n/a 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: n/a 
• Malpractice Susceptible: n/a 
• Legal Liability: n/a 
 
 
4.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 1 of the LoA 
AILR is designated as “no” for each of the APL/UPL 
key factors.  
 
This designating of “no” seems applicable for Level 1 
since the automation is considered a simple construct 
and does not embody any AI autonomous capabilities. 
Note that though a vendor or developer of such simple 
legal technology might wish to claim that their system 
provides legal advice, and for which this is still an 
open question per the exemplar of LegalZoom 
discussed in Section 1, for the purposes herein, it is 
suggested that this is not the case at Level 1, but might 
be the case at Level 2 (see next subsection). 
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Here then is Level 1: 
 
Level 1 
• Provides Legal Advice: No 
• Asserts Practices Law: No 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: No 
• Qualified in Law: No 
• Incurs Duty of Care: No 
• Legal Confidentiality: No 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: No 
• Malpractice Susceptible: No 
• Legal Liability: No 
 
 
4.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, the Level 2 of the 
LoA AILR is designated as “no” for the 
preponderance of the APL/UPL key factors, and has 
the designation of “maybe” for two of the factors, 
namely for “Provides Legal Advice” and for “Legal 
Liability.” 
 
This designating of “no” seems applicable for most of 
Level 2 since the automation does not embody any AI 
autonomous capabilities.  
 
Despite the lack of AI autonomous capabilities, there 
is the gray area of whether the automation has entered 
into the realm of providing legal advice and thus the 
use of “maybe” as a designator.  
 
Referring to the discussion of Section 1 about 
LegalZoom as an exemplar, there is still an open 
question of how far beyond the act of providing a form 
does it take for the threshold of dispensing legal advice 
to arise. If there is legal advice being proffered, it 
would seem logically consequential that an invocation 
of legal liability could potentially also be raised 
regarding the legal advice being so offered, and thus 
the use of “maybe” as a designator for the “Legal 
Liability” factor. 
  
 
 
 
 
Here then is Level 2: 
 
Level 2 
• Provides Legal Advice: Maybe 
• Asserts Practices Law: No 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: No  
• Qualified in Law: No 
• Incurs Duty of Care: No 
• Legal Confidentiality: No 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: No 
• Malpractice Susceptible: No 
• Legal Liability: Maybe 
 
 
4.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, the Level 3 of the 
LoA AILR is designated as a mixture of “no” for 
many of the APL/UPL key factors, and has the 
designation of “yes,” “minimal,” and “likely” for three 
factors, respectively “Provides Legal Advice,” 
“Qualified in Law,” and “Legal Liability.” 
 
This designating of “no” seems applicable for much of 
Level 3 since the automation is only partially 
embodying AI autonomous capabilities, considered as 
semi-autonomous. Due to the semi-autonomous 
nature, it could be argued that systems in Level 3 are 
providing legal advice, of which presumably do so 
they need to be qualified in law (at least to some 
minimal amount), and the provisioning of legal advice 
would seem to place such systems into the exposure of 
legal liability for doing so. 
 
Here then is Level 3: 
 
Level 3 
• Provides Legal Advice: Yes 
• Asserts Practices Law: No 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: No 
• Qualified in Law: Minimal 
• Incurs Duty of Care: No 
• Legal Confidentiality: No 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: No 
• Malpractice Susceptible: No 
• Legal Liability: Likely 
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4.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, the Level 4 of the 
LoA AILR is designated as a mixture of “likely” for 
many of the APL/UPL key factors, and has the 
designation of “yes” and “partial” for three factors, 
respectively “Asserts Practices Law,” “Lawyer-Client 
Relationship,” “Qualified in Law.” 
 
For purposes of nomenclature, the use of the word 
“partial” and the word “likely” are admittedly 
somewhat ill-defined and open to interpretation, which 
is intended for now as to the initial instantiation of this 
grid. As mentioned in Section 5, it is hoped and 
anticipated that further research will be undertaken to 
clarify and more discretely specify these designations. 
 
In Level 4, a significant consideration is that the 
autonomy of the AILR arises only in selected domain 
or subdomain strata, thus, there is an inherent 
restriction or qualification involved. As will be 
indicated for Level 5 and Level 6, there are no such 
limits and therefore the use of designators such as 
“partial” or “likely” are no longer warranted in those 
levels. 
 
Here then is Level 4: 
 
Level 4 
• Provides Legal Advice: Yes 
• Asserts Practices Law: Yes 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: Partial 
• Qualified in Law: Partial 
• Incurs Duty of Care: Likely 
• Legal Confidentiality: Likely 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: Likely 
• Malpractice Susceptible: Likely 
• Legal Liability: Likely 
 
 
4.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 5 of the LoA 
AILR are designated as a series of “yes” designations 
for each of the APL/UPL key factors. 
 
In brief, since the AI Legal Reasoning is considered 
fully versed at the Level 5, it would seem 
corresponding that there would be an expectation 
enveloping the AILR that it ought to comply with the 
same set of APL/UPL factors as established for human 
lawyers. There are thorny questions that arise in this 
indication due to the unclear nature of whether the 
AILR itself can be held accountable and considered 
responsible per se, or whether this semblance of 
assignability is not extendable to AI systems, perhaps 
being borne instead by others such as those that have 
developed the AILR or fielded the AILR. These are 
ongoing and problematic questions, already being 
earnestly explored in the field of AI and the law, 
which will undoubtedly continue for quite some time 
ahead. 
 
Here then is Level 5: 
 
Level 5 
• Provides Legal Advice: Yes 
• Asserts Practices Law: Yes 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: Yes 
• Qualified in Law: Yes 
• Incurs Duty of Care: Yes 
• Legal Confidentiality: Yes 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: Yes 
• Malpractice Susceptible: Yes 
• Legal Liability: Yes 
 
 
4.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, the Level 6 of the 
LoA AILR is designated as a series of “yes” 
designations for each of the APL/UPL key factors, and 
three indicating “yes plus,” consisting of “Provides 
Legal Advice,” “Asserts Practices Law,” and 
“Qualified in Law.” 
 
The basis for providing a “yes plus” designation is that 
this Level 6 is the as-yet-known superhuman 
formulation of AI, and presumably, such AI would 
exceed the human capacity of lawyering. In that light, 
it seems prudent to suggest that the Level 6 can 
provide legal advice beyond that of humans, 
designated as  “yes plus,” and asserts the practice of 
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law to a “yes plus” accordingly, and surpasses the 
human boundaries of being qualified for the law too. 
 
Similar to the discussion given about the Level 5 
aspect, mentioned in the prior subsection, since the AI 
Legal Reasoning is considered fully versed at the 
Level 6 (and even more so versed, at some 
superhuman capacity), it would seem corresponding 
that there would be an expectation enveloping the 
AILR that it ought to comply with the same set of 
APL/UPL factors as established for human lawyers. 
As stated about Level 5, there are thorny questions that 
arise in this indication for Level 6 too, due to the 
unclear nature of whether the AILR itself can be held 
accountable and considered responsible per se, or 
whether this semblance of assignability is not 
extendable to AI systems, perhaps being borne instead 
by others such as those that have developed the AILR 
or fielded the AILR. These are ongoing and 
problematic questions, already being earnestly 
explored in the field of AI and the law, which will 
undoubtedly continue for quite some time ahead. 
 
Here then is Level 6: 
 
Level 6 
• Provides Legal Advice: Yes Plus 
• Asserts Practices Law: Yes Plus 
• Lawyer-Client Relationship: Yes 
• Qualified in Law: Yes Plus 
• Incurs Duty of Care: Yes 
• Legal Confidentiality: Yes 
• Enforceable Prof Conduct: Yes 
• Malpractice Susceptible: Yes 
• Legal Liability: Yes 
 
 
4.2 Grid Indication of APL/UPL Key Factors 
by Levels of Autonomy (LoA) 
 
The next subsections showcase the APL/UPL key 
factors as at-a-glance for each factor, listing the 
designations that have been postulated for each of the 
LoA AILR levels.  
 
Narrative discussion about these facets has already 
been covered in the prior Subsection 4.1 and thus it is 
not necessary to repeat it in this subsection (refer to 
the prior subsections as needed). 
 
4.2.1 APL/UPL “Provides Legal Advice” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Provides Legal 
Advice” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Provides Legal Advice 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: Maybe 
• Level 3: Yes 
• Level 4: Yes 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes Plus 
 
4.2.2 APL/UPL “Asserts Practices Law” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Asserts Practices 
Law” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Asserts Practices Law 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Yes 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes Plus 
 
4.2.3 APL/UPL “Lawyer-Client Relationship” LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Lawyer-Client 
Relationship” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
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Lawyer-Client Relationship 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Partial 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
 
 
4.2.4 APL/UPL “Qualified in Law” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Qualified in 
Law” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Qualified in Law 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: Minimal 
• Level 4: Partial 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes Plus 
 
 
4.2.5 APL/UPL “Incurs Duty of Care” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Incurs Duty of 
Care” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Incurs Duty of Care 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Likely 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.6 APL/UPL “Legal Confidentiality” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Legal 
Confidentiality” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see 
the preceding subsections. This list shown here 
provides the convenience of indication and is also 
portrayed on charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Legal Confidentiality 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Likely 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
 
4.2.7 APL/UPL “Enforceable Prof Conduct” LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Enforceable Prof 
Conduct” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Enforceable Prof Conduct 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Likely 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
 
4.2.8 APL/UPL “Malpractice Susceptible” by LoA 
For a narrative discussion about the “Malpractice 
Susceptible” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Malpractice Susceptible 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: No 
• Level 3: No 
• Level 4: Likely 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
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4.2.9 APL/UPL “Legal Liability” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Legal Liability” 
for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the preceding 
subsections. This list shown here provides the 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Legal Liability 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: No 
• Level 2: Maybe 
• Level 3: Likely 
• Level 4: Likely 
• Level 5: Yes 
• Level 6: Yes 
 
 
5.0 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
The grid depicted in Figure B-1 and Figure B-2 is a 
strawman variant, meaning that the indications shown 
are an initial populating of the grid. Additional 
research is needed to explore the designations and 
ascertain whether the initial indications might be 
advisedly changed or possibly transformed into some 
other kind of designations, such as numeric scores or 
weights. 
 
Another aspect of additional research involves the 
APL/UPL key factors that are utilized in this strawman 
variant. There are other ways to portray the factors, 
along with the possibility of adding factors or possibly 
opting to excise some of the factors from the grid. 
Research on such modifications is encouraged. As a 
final point, there are potentially greater questions that 
arise from the grid, alluded to earlier in the discussion 
of the prior sections, entailing what actions would be 
taken if indeed AILR can achieve the autonomous 
levels of Level 4, Level 5, and Level 6. There remain 
many such open issues, each deserving of suitable 
attention. 
 
The FTC observed that the practice-of-law is being 
buffeted and disrupted by a multitude of societal, 
economic, and technological changes, as stated in a 
2016 memorandum [47]: 
 
“The legal services marketplace has experienced a 
number of changes in recent years. These trends 
include: client demands for more cost-effective and 
efficient services; unbundling of services and 
disaggregation of legal matters across multiple 
service providers; development of new billing 
models and law firm models; geographic expansion 
of law firms and other legal services providers; 
provision by non-law firms of certain services 
previously obtained exclusively from law firms; 
increased use of automation technologies; online 
matching, reviewing, and ranking of lawyers; and 
use of Internet, World Wide Web, and related 
computer technologies to deliver legal services. In 
particular, the increased use of computer, software, 
and online technologies has enabled non-lawyers to 
provide many services that historically were 
provided exclusively by lawyers and traditional law 
firms.” 
 
As pointed out in the FTC commentary, legal 
technologies are increasingly enabling non-lawyers to 
provide legal services that would normally be 
considered more so UPL then APL. The next step 
would seem to be excising the need for a non-lawyer, 
making use of an autonomous AI Legal Reasoning 
system in place of any human-based assistance or 
intervention in delivering legal services and legal 
advice [51] [53]. That day has not yet arrived [5] [35], 
but the future appears to encompass such a possibility 
and it is worthwhile today to examine how the legal 
profession might need to inexorably adjust in the face 
of such a significant disruption. 
 
This paper has provided and explored a newly derived 
instrumental grid depicting the key characteristics 
underlying APL and UPL as they apply to the AILR 
autonomous levels and has sought to provide key 
insights and spur informed discussions regarding the 
furtherance of crucial practice-of-law deliberations. 
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Figure A-1 
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Figure A-2 
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Figure B-1 
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Figure B-2 
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Figure B-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
